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In the social, legal and political context of any society, crime, justice and culture are 
interconnected. Crime is constructed by the response of criminal justice agencies 
(Nelken, 1994), while the response itself is constructed by what is defined, legally and 
socially, as crime; both are inextricably linked to, and by, normative, cultural and 
historically formed ideas about what law is and how and when it should be used (Brants 
2010: 11-20; Lacey 2002). Like crime, justice is a social construction and as such it is 
self-evident to those who live it, to the ‘insiders’ (Nelken 2000: 10-11). Within socio-
legal studies, justice is most usually studied from the perspective of legal culture, defined 
as a dialectical relationship between society, the political arrangements that shape the 
organisation and practice of justice, and the (criminal) law that determines its normative 
limits (Brants 2011: 50). It makes a difference whether we approach criminal justice as a 
manifestation of legal culture or as a social construction. The former is primarily 
concerned with law and legal tradition, in particular procedure, the latter more with the 
interaction between definitions of social problems and practice than with law.  
Despite the difference in focus, it is useful to view each perspective as part of, and 
complementary to the other. The concept of legal culture can help explain the existence 
and consequences of differences between legal systems and is particularly useful for 
understanding the significance of tradition in enduring procedural divergence (Field 
2009, pointing to, among other things, the conservative nature of legal culture). On the 
other hand, a social constructionist perspective can provide insight into why societies are 
both highly conservative, clinging to their own ideas of what are best justice practices 
including what should and should not be criminalised, and are yet amenable to change as 
the law, different power groups and public opinion interact in a changing social, political 
and legal context (Brants and Field 2000). 
This article is concerned with how tradition and change affect differences 
between jurisdictions within the European Union, where supranational legal structures 
and ideologies appear to leave little room for the ‘insider perspective’. The principles of 
mutual recognition and harmonisation of criminal law and procedure in Member States 
have created a legal sphere transcending the national. It presupposes a common legal 
order in which a shared conception of fair trial is the norm and provisions of substantive 
law are, if not identical, then at least totally compatible and based on common notions of 
harm. Whether or not harmonisation is desirable is not the issue here. My concern is with 
the assumptions that underlie an ongoing process and their effect on criminal justice in 
the national sphere. Can we assume a common legal order of criminal justice in which 
conceptions of fair trial and harmonised substantive law are shared across the European 
Union? Or do different social constructions and legal cultures at the national level (and 
the resulting supranational political compromise) pose limits to how far we can approach 
this purportedly ideal state of affairs? And, if that is the case, how do they make 
themselves felt and what are the consequences?  
 
 
A European legal culture? 
 
A common legal order of European justice, the area of Freedom, Security and Justice to 
which the EU originally simply aspired (Articles 2 and 29 ff. TEU) but which it now 
‘shall constitute’ (Article 67-1 TFEU), implies a common legal culture and shared social 
construction of justice. Indeed, the principle of mutual recognition (Art 67-3 TFEU), 
mainstay of EU criminal policy, simply assumes shared values and practices on the basis 
of which states can and must trust each other in order to promote a common goal of 
efficient criminal justice that will serve common interests. The European Arrest Warrant, 
with its expeditious surrender procedures and no questions asked, is a case in point.1 But 
the very fact that it obliges Member States to surrender a suspect without resort to the 
usual guarantee of dual criminality (Article 2-1 EAW) is proof that substantive criminal 
law across Europe does not reflect shared notions of harm or shared constructions of what 
constitutes a crime. And that fellow Member States are to be trusted on due process rights 
because they are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, is gainsaid by the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights – where every Member State has been found wanting on some issue of fair trial.2    
  Where states continue to base justice practices on their own norms and 
procedures, obligations to cooperate and substantive and procedural harmonisation are 
seen as essential for mutual recognition. Therefore, Article 82-2 TFEU gives the 
European Council and Parliament the power to establish minimum rules to facilitate 
police and judicial cooperation and mutual recognition of judgments and judicial 
decisions. The EU was quicker to expedite European crime control and require 
harmonisation of substantive law (for example with regard to money laundering and 
terrorism) than to start work on European-wide safeguards and fair trial rights (Brants 
2005: 104) and a Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on procedural rights in 
2004 died a lingering death in some Brussels drawer.3 This, however, has now been 
followed by a ‘roadmap’ for strengthening procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
(drawn up by the Council in 2009 and appended to the Stockholm Programme in 2010).4 
It provides for a step by step approach through Directives concerning specific procedural 
rights.  
This EU initiative complements Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that has been around for much longer, and is not 
                                                 
1 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, according to which (Preamble 10) ‘the mechanism of the 
European Arrest Warrant is based on a high level of confidence between Member States.’ 
2 In signing up to the ECHR, there was a general feeling among states that they were doing so in order to 
improve the others’ criminal process – theirs, of course, already complied with the obligations of the 
Convention (Swart 1997).   
3 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union, Brussels 28.4.2004, COM(2004)328 final. 
4 See The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 2010 OJ 
C115/1.  
without its harmonising effects either. Lacking the 2nd paragraph that allows limitations 
to most other Convention rights, it appears to brook no exceptions. Decades ago this had 
already forced several countries to change, for example, how they deal with witness 
evidence.5 Indeed, it has been suggested that the European Convention and the emphasis 
on effective crime control in Europe may render traditional difference obsolete (Spencer 
2002: 20; Jackson 2005). Yet, provisions of substantive criminal law, procedural rules 
and the legal culture and social constructions from which they spring and which sustain 
them, still diverge across Member States, in some cases widely.  
The preamble to harmonising Directives has a standard phrase: ‘[T]hough the 
Member States are party to the ECHR and to the ICCPR, experience has shown that that 
alone does not always provide a sufficient degree of trust in the criminal justice systems 
of other Member States’ – a polite way of saying that ECHR compliance is neither 
complete and nor has it led, in practice at least, to a common norm of fair trial. This is 
hardly surprising given that the European Court of Human Rights does not prescribe a 
particular form of criminal process or organisation of criminal justice. There is no single 
model to which the Convention aspires, no paradis procedural (Pradel and Corstens, 
2002:302), and in considering whether the ‘procedure as a whole’ is fair, the Court 
essentially holds each system to the guarantees of its own procedural traditions. At the same 
time, according to Article 67-1 (TFEU) the Union ‘shall constitute an area of freedom, 
security and justice with respect for […] the different legal systems and traditions of the 
Member States.’ Article 82-2 (TFEU) adds that rules of criminal procedure established 
by the EU should ‘take into account the differences between the legal traditions and 
systems of the Member States.’  
Nevertheless, states have obligations deriving from EU directives, not only 
procedural but also to prosecute and punish behaviour they may not regard as particularly 
harmful or wish to deal with in another way, while the European Convention requires that 
prosecution, trial and punishment comply with international human rights norms. At the 
same time, neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the European Union can 
simply impose definitions of criminal behaviour or fair trial. Even after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which abolished the third pillar with its state sovereignty in criminal matters, 
replaced unanimity with majority vote in Council decisions, gave the Parliament greater 
influence and turned Framework Decisions into Directives, the latter must still be 
thrashed out in political compromise and are then only binding as to results.  
States must ensure they meet certain minimum standards, but are free as to how 
they achieve that end; the same applies to decisions by the European Court. Finally, the 
end result has to be translated into action in a national context. Paper, as a Dutch saying 
goes, is patient: practice rooted in legal cultures and self-evident social constructions may 
be less amenable to change than the letter of the law or the professed willingness to 
cooperate suggests. The following two sections take a closer look at this issue, using two 
examples from the Netherlands. The first concerns the influence of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the EU on the right to have a lawyer present during police 
questioning,6 the second the harmonisation of substantive law regarding hate crime.   
 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Kostovski v the Netherlands, 20.11.1989 (11454/85) and Unterpertinger v Austria, 24.11.1986 
(9120/80). 
6 A Directive to that end forms Step C of the Stockholm programme. 
 The right to a lawyer during police questioning in the Netherlands  
 
Despite common Convention principles, in practice legal assistance varies significantly 
across Member States. Given that the right to effective legal assistance is regarded as 
crucial to a fair trial (Article 6-3 ECHR), such differences could form an obstacle to 
cooperation and mutual recognition. It was therefore one of the rights contained in the 
proposed Framework Decision on procedural rights, though it proved impossible to 
formulate it in unequivocal terms that were acceptable to Member States (Brants 2003). 
In 2008, however, the European Court of Human Rights found a breach of Article 6-3 
ECHR in a Turkish case concerning police interrogation of a minor without a lawyer 
present and the subsequent use of his confession in evidence.7 Other cases successively 
broadened the scope of ‘the right to access to a lawyer’.8 Although the so-called Salduz-
doctrine (after the first case) seems to include the right to have a lawyer present during 
police questioning (this is implied in particular in the Busco and Navone decisions), the 
Court never actually used the words ‘physical presence’ and the judgments leave room 
for restrictive interpretation. Not so, however, the new EU Directive9 that establishes the 
right of suspects or accused persons to effective and confidential legal assistance, 
including ‘the right for their lawyer to be present and participate effectively when 
questioned’ (Article 3.3b).  
One of the Member States still not in compliance with this requirement is the 
Netherlands. Since the introduction in 1926 of the current Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure, anyone remanded in custody has the right to confidential legal assistance. 
During pre-trial interrogation by the investigating magistrate, the suspect has the right to 
have a lawyer present. This has always been interpreted to mean that, a contrario, no 
such right exists during police interrogations (Fijnaut 1987). Over the decades, attempts 
by the Bar to force change produced nothing. As late as 2004, an influential study, though 
advocating that suspects be given the right to consult with a lawyer prior to interrogation, 
was adamant that ‘police questioning must start without delay and be geared towards 
truth finding. We therefore do not recommend that a lawyer be present.’ (Groenhuijsen 
and Knigge 2004: 78-79). It was a stance shared by most academics and legal 
practitioners other than criminal defence lawyers. 
Then the European Court of Human Rights produced Salduz. The Dutch 
government immediately recognised that this would require an amendment to the law and 
police practice.10 Meanwhile, the Dutch Supreme Court interpreted Salduz as minimally 
as possible: a suspect had the right to consult a lawyer prior to the first police 
interrogation, to be informed of that right, and, barring an unequivocal waiver or other 
                                                 
7 Salduz v Turkey, 27.11.2008 (36391/02). 
8 Panovits v Cyprus, 11.12.2008 (4268/04); Shabelnik v Ukraine, 19.02.2009 (16404/03), Płonka v Poland, 
31.03.2009 (20310/02);  Pishchalnikov v Russia, 24.09.2009 (7025/04); Dayanan v Turkey, 13.01.2010 
(7377/03); Zaichenko v Russia,18.02.2010 (39660/02), Brusco v France, 14.10.2010 (1466/07); Navone 
and others v. Monaco, 24.10.2013, (62880/11, 62892/11, 62899/11). 
9 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of 
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to 
have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with 
consular authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ  L 294. 
10 Letter from the Minister to Parliament, 15 April 2009, Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31 700VI, no 117. 
urgent reasons connected with the investigation, to be able within reasonable limits to 
exercise it. Statements by the suspect without his having enjoyed the (relevant) right and 
other evidence found as a direct result of such statements should be excluded. But the 
Supreme Court did not infer a general right, other than for minors, to a lawyer during 
questioning.11 Much remained unresolved and, with legislation not expected for some 
time, it was left to the prosecution service to fill in the details by issuing binding 
instructions to the police.12 The ensuing prosecution directive gave minors the right to 
have a lawyer present (although explicitly stating: ‘the lawyer’s attitude should be one of 
restraint so as not to delay or influence the interrogation’), but adults were only to be 
informed on arrest of their right to consult a lawyer prior to the first interrogation. 
Whether or not this situation complied with ECHR requirements is a moot point, 
for it certainly contravenes the EU Directive. Moreover, despite the ideological resistance 
in criminal justice circles to the presence of lawyers during police interrogations, the 
stream of decisions emanating from Strasbourg and the threat of EU-legislation had 
already undermined the Dutch position. Even the Minister of Security and Justice 
grudgingly conceded that probably ‘in future the rights embodied in Article 6 will include 
the right to not only consult a lawyer prior to and during police interrogations but also to 
have one present in the interrogation room’.13 The head of the prosecution service called 
on government and courts to give up their ‘last ditch stand’ and to accept and prepare for 
‘the inevitable’.14  
Now, six years after Salduz, legislation to implement the EU-Directive in the form 
of amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, is in the final stages of parliamentary 
procedure. Replacing an earlier and less far-reaching proposal, it introduces a (waivable) 
right to have a lawyer present, although it provides for as many exceptions as possible 
negotiated by the Member States (and especially the Netherlands). In particular, it makes 
full use of Article 3,6 of the Directive which allows, in exceptional circumstances and 
only at the pre-trial stage, temporary derogation from the application of the rights 
provided for in paragraph 3.15 At the same time, a new government decree restricts the 
lawyer to certain interventions and allows him questions only at the beginning and the 
end of the police interview.16 Presumably this is regarded as compliance with Article 2,3b 
of the Directive: ‘participation [of the lawyer] shall be in accordance with procedures 
under national law, provided that such procedures do not prejudice the effective exercise 
and essence of the right concerned’. On the other hand, for reasons too technical to be 
explained here, the government found it ‘impossible’ (some regret in the terminology 
                                                 
11 Hoge Raad 30 June 2009, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2009, 351 
12 ‘Aanwijzing rechtsbijstand politieverhoor (2010A007)’,  Staatscourant 2010, 4003 
13 Letter to the Second Chamber of Parliament from the Minister of Security and Justice, dated 16 
November 2010 (DDS5673300), at www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden. 
14 Procurator-General Harm Brouwer, head of the Dutch Prosecution Service, speech Rotterdam 24 
February 2011. 
15 Such derogation is only legitimate ‘to the extent justified in the light of the particular circumstances of 
the case’, i.e. if there is an urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical 
integrity of a person or if immediate action by the investigating authorities is imperative to prevent 
substantial jeopardy to the investigation. 
16 Article 5 Besluit inrichting en orde politieverhoor (13-02-2014). All this proposed legislation to be found 
at: www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2014/02/13/recht-op-bijstand-van-raadsman-tijdens-politieverhoor 
there) to include the exception for minor offences sanctioned by an authority other than a 
court, or where deprivation of liberty cannot be imposed.  
The long-standing Dutch resistance to a fair trial guarantee that many European 
states regard as self-evident can only be understood if we take into account Dutch 
inquisitorial legal culture that has always informed legal thinking on the suspect in pre-
trial process and places unquestioning faith in the criminal justice authorities, in 
particular the prosecution service (Brants and Field 2000). These ideas were strongly 
reflected in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1926. Although it has been amended 
many times, not least because of ECHR requirements, the deeply rooted underlying ideas 
have not disappeared: the state must search for the truth by all appropriate means, the 
suspect is primarily an object of investigation and a source of information, and the 
prosecutor, who is in charge of the police, can be trusted not only to seek the truth 
impartially but also to act, as it were, for the suspect and take his interests into account.  
From this perspective, pre-trial rights, including legal assistance, have no added 
value; on the contrary, they merely hamper the whole exercise as actually using them 
would probably impede the investigation. Thus, provisions granting such rights always 
have a second paragraph: ‘…unless in the opinion of the investigating magistrate (or the 
prosecutor, or even sometimes, the police) the interests of the investigation make the 
exercise of right X, Y or Z undesirable’ (or some such formulation). The matter of legal 
assistance is seen as part of the search for the truth, made more difficult if false 
confessions or statements put the police on the wrong track; the interests of the suspect – 
except in the truth – are almost an afterthought and take second place to the interests of 
the investigation.  
That was always the view and is the view still. In a recent decision, after both 
Novone and the advent of the Directive, the Dutch Supreme Court still refused to budge, 
despite the learned advice of the Advocate General (a member of the prosecution service) 
that a right to the presence of a lawyer could no longer be denied. It merely repeated that 
the European Court of Human Rights did not unequivocally require more than prior 
consultation, adding that the Directive provides for a transitional period until 2016 before 
national implementation is required.17 Until such time, it is obviously not prepared to 
abandon the entrenched traditional position. This attitude is rather ominous as far as the 
future scope of the new legislation is concerned. Although the amendments are, even if 
reluctantly, revolutionary in the Dutch context, it remains to be seen how the Dutch 
Supreme Court will eventually interpret them. (What, for example, will it regard as 
‘exceptional’ to warrant excluding the lawyer from police questioning?) Paper can be 
very patient indeed. 
 
 
Substantive criminal law on hate crime18  
 
Since the 1970’s, the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (better known as CERD),19 the Durban Declaration20 and 
                                                 
17 Hoge Raad 01.04.2014, ECLI 770.  
18 This section is based on three studies of hate speech and hate crime in the Netherlands: Brants et al. 
2007, Van Noorloos 2011 and Grijsen 2012 and 2013. 
recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI),21 have called for the criminalisation of ‘hate crimes’. Most of these 
organisations provide minimum standards to be adopted in national criminal law. 
Nevertheless, differences continued to exist among EU Member States. The aim of the 
2008 EU Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia was to end that 
situation by harmonising legislation in all Member States.22 Article 3 of the Framework 
Decision obliges Member States to ensure that hate speech (including instigation, aiding 
and abetting) is punishable by effective and deterrent penalties of between at least 1 and 3 
years. Hate speech is public incitement to racial violence or religious hatred, or 
disseminating such material, and includes publicly condoning, denying or grossly 
trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in a manner 
likely to incite to such violence or hatred. Article 4 refers to hate crimes (offences 
motivated by racial hatred) and obliges Member States to ensure that racist and 
xenophobic motivation is considered an aggravating circumstance, or that such 
motivation may be taken into consideration by the courts in sentencing.23 
Again we have an obligation requiring that domestic law of the EU Member 
States be changed with a view to harmonisation. The reluctance and procrastination 
encountered in the Netherlands with regard to the right to have a lawyer present during 
police interrogations is easily understood in terms of Dutch inquisitorial procedure that, 
traditionally, has no room for such a right. The situation with regard to the substantive 
law that is the target of the Racism Directive, however, is very much more complicated. 
In theory, Dutch law already complied with the Directive and no legislative changes have 
been necessary. However, in the Netherlands, the social construction of hate speech and 
hate crime and the practice of prosecution and sentencing are very different to what the 
EU-Directive envisages. So different, in fact, that its very terminology is hardly 
appropriate in the Dutch case. The following describes the legislation, its traditional 
position in Dutch legal and political culture and the changes in the political and social 
context that have occurred in recent years. These have brought about disagreement 
between and within the police, the prosecution service and the judiciary as to the best 
way of dealing with what the Directive refers to as hate crimes, and political and social 
uncertainty about the criminal nature of hate speech. In that light, what may look like 
perfectly harmonised legislation on paper may turn out to be nothing of the sort in 
practice. 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660,195, at: 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid. 
20 United Nations, Durban Declaration and Plan of Action, Adopted at the World Conference Against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Violence, 8 September 2001, at: 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid. 
21 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation N°7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial 
discrimination, 15 January 2003, CM(2003)8 Addendum II; ECRI, General Policy Recommendation N°11 
on combating racism and racial discrimination in policing, 7 August 2007, CM(2007)116. 
22 Council Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia 
by Means of Criminal Law 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008, OJ L 328/55. 
23 At the national level, hate crime and hate speech usually cover more than racial and religious hatred to 
include bias against homosexuals, the disabled, etc. International instruments, however, are almost 
exclusively concerned with race, ethnicity and related religious matters.  
Since the 1930’s, the Dutch Criminal Code contains the specific offences of both 
incitement to hatred or discrimination and moreover any public statement or distribution 
of material which involves ‘group defamation’. A number of amendments over the years 
have extended the definition to include defamatory remarks referring to not only the race 
and religion of a social group, but also to hetero- or homosexual orientation and 
disability. It is important to note that what is normally referred to as ‘hate speech’ in 
other countries, the Dutch call ‘discriminatory defamation’ and that, in so far as there is 
no incitement to hatred or violence (which is a separate offence), Dutch anti-
discrimination law criminalises only defamatory statements that can be construed as 
referring to a specific group as such; defamatory remarks about individuals that do not 
refer to a group constitute ordinary criminal insult (even if it is discriminatory). For 
example: the remark ‘Dirty Moroccan’ is criminal insult; ‘Dirty Moroccan, you are all the 
same’ is ‘discriminatory defamation’ because of the reference to the group. Trivialisation 
of genocide and holocaust-denial are not specific offences, but statements about such 
atrocities that can be construed as defamatory towards the Jewish or another population 
group constitute discriminatory defamation. 
This legislation complies with the Framework Decision in the sense that it 
criminalises what the EU wants to see criminalised as far as speech is concerned 
(although the dissemination of material carries a maximum of six months, well short of 
the required year). However, on the one hand, the Dutch offences have a much broader 
connotation than in the Framework Decision and are not limited to (participation in) 
incitement. On the other hand, because they are construed as a form of discrimination, 
not hate or prejudice (although these may well be the underlying sentiment), biased 
motives are irrelevant to these crimes. The required intent is present and the offence is 
committed if, given the context, the words used can be assumed to be discriminatory. 
 Moreover, unlike the European concept that separates hate speech from hate 
crime, discriminatory group defamation is the primary form in the Netherlands and ‘hate 
crime’ as defined by the Directive does not exist. Obviously, crimes such as criminal 
insult, assault, causing grievous bodily harm, even arson and murder, are committed in 
the Netherlands for the simple reason that the perpetrator is prejudiced towards, wants to 
discriminate against or otherwise hates the victim because of his/her race or religion. But 
this only constitutes the Dutch form of hate crime if the grounds for that prejudice 
correspond to those for discriminatory group defamation. In that case, a prosecution 
directive, not the law, instructs the prosecutor to demand that the court impose a 50 –
100% enhancement of the penalty it would normally have given, although never more 
than the maximum allowed for the underlying crime.24 The Dutch government argued 
(successfully) against the minimum penalties originally foreseen in the Framework 
Decision and for the much milder version of judicial discretion to take biased motivation 
into account.  
 
Social and political context 
                                                 
24 While every offence carries a minimum penalty of 1 day imprisonment or a fine of € 3, statutory 
maximum penalties in the Netherlands can be quite high. However, given the wide discretion of judges in 
sentencing, it is unusual for anything near the maximum to actually be imposed in all but the most serious 
cases.  
While the Decision is binding only as to results and Dutch law seems to comply, the 
relevant offences in the Netherlands are best described as ‘criminal discrimination’: 
discriminatory group defamation and all the offences of the Criminal Code (including 
insulting an individual) that are regarded as more blameworthy if (as the prosecution 
directive has it) committed in a ‘discriminatory context’ (no mention of biased motives). 
The emphasis is on discriminatory group defamation, which is regarded as a public order 
offence: the harm it causes is primarily seen as to a democratic order based on tolerance 
and equality, and the first aim of criminalisation is to preserve decent, tolerant public 
discourse. Unlike other countries that were much worried about the effect of hate speech 
provisions on the freedom of expression, the Dutch saw no problem in the state defining 
the limits of public discourse on discrimination; the exception that no liability attaches 
for the professional distribution (journalism, academic writing) of what would otherwise 
be discriminatory or inflammatory material, is seen as more than adequate protection. 
There are two main reasons for this lack of concern.  
Traditionally, in the typically Dutch political order known as ‘pillarization’, the 
stratification of society was along vertical lines of religious and political affiliation rather 
than horizontal class divisions. Political and social stability depended on the ability of the 
ruling elites of each pillar to both compromise on major issues and to persuade their 
constituents of the necessity of such compromise. In this socio-political climate of 
‘pacification and accommodation’ (Lijphart 1968), the freedom to publicly disagree with 
what political leaders established as being ‘in the common good’ was not rated highly (to 
put it mildly). Second, while this was changing in the 1970’s and the Criminal Code was 
extensively amended to accommodate CERD obligations, at that point there was 
consensus that issues of freedom of expression were unlikely to arise since there would 
probably be no prosecutions – there was, it was thought, practically no discrimination, 
verbal or otherwise, in the Netherlands.  
Both of these situations have changed (if indeed it was ever true that there was no 
discrimination25). Pillarization gradually disappeared, although the politics of 
compromise and accommodation did not, and as the number of migrants increased, it 
became very clear that there was discrimination a-plenty. However, if from the 1970’s 
onwards people (and media) were more likely to engage in critical public debate, these 
were also the decades of multiculturalism. While in many other countries it was merely 
politically incorrect to speak disparagingly of ethnic minorities, in the Netherlands anti-
discrimination law was used with increasing frequency, even against politicians for such 
seemingly mild statements as ‘the country is full’. In the new century, the discrediting of 
multiculturalism, the rise of anti-Islam populist politics (Pim Fortuyn and then Geert 
Wilders) and the murder of first Fortuyn and then Theo van Gogh (a popular journalist 
known for his extreme anti-Islam views) have brought sweeping changes to the once 
‘tolerant’ Netherlands. With that has come a change in the social construction of 
discrimination as a crime; indeed, the populist leader Geert Wilders was acquitted of 
what would be, in other countries, incitement to hate and violence,26 and a member’s bill 
has recently been introduced in parliament proposing to remove the provisions on 
                                                 
25 Several studies show widespread verbal and practical discrimination against migrant labourers during the 
1960’s and 1970’s. See e.g. Bovenkerk 1978a and 1978b. 
26 See Appeal Court Amsterdam, 21 January 2009, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2009,191; and District 
Court Amsterdam, 23 June 2011, LJN BQ9001 (www.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraken). See also: Mudde 2007. 
discriminatory group defamation and incitement to hate (though not violence) from the 
Criminal Code entirely.27 While it may not make it through the legislative process, the 
very existence of this bill is indicative of the changes that have occurred. 
 
The legal cultural context of policing, prosecution and sentencing  
Paradoxically, the prosecution service has increased its efforts to bring criminal 
discrimination in all its forms (verbal and physical) to justice and many more such crimes 
now come to the attention of the police. Whether or not there is an actual increase in the 
crime rate is debatable. One could infer that, if journalists and politicians get away with 
calling Muslims ‘goat-fuckers’ (Theo van Gogh) and Islam a ‘retarded religion’ 
(Fortuyn), or with comparing the Koran to Mein Kampf  and calling for the ‘removal of 
despicable elements’ (Wilders), ordinary people may not be too adverse to racially or 
religiously motivated insults or even assaults. On the other hand, so sensitized have the 
Netherlands become to issues of race and religion (in particular Islam), that the seeming 
rise in discriminatory crime may simply be a result of heightened awareness on the part 
of both victims and police. In any event, the prosecution and the police regard criminal 
discrimination as a serious and increasing social problem, but are divided as to how to 
deal with it. The roots of this situation lie in a combination of changing social definitions 
of discriminatory speech as criminal in relation to the freedom of expression, and 
overriding legal-cultural characteristics of both prosecution and sentencing: broad police, 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion, based on confidence in the criminal justice 
authorities and especially the prosecution service, coupled with the notion – reaching 
back to the consensual days of pillarization – that to prosecute is to invite further social 
conflict, so that more consensual ways of dealing with crime are to be preferred.  
Few Member States give such wide and exclusive powers to the prosecutor as the 
Netherlands. This is particularly the case with regard to the prerogative to institute 
criminal proceedings (monopoly principle) and to waive prosecution ‘for reasons of 
public interest’ even if there is sufficient evidence for a conviction (principle of 
expediency). Waiving prosecution for reasons of public interest is the norm. Although 
this form of the expediency principle is under pressure because of growing public and 
political demands for law enforcement and the increasing influence of the European 
Union with its heightened focus on criminal law (i.a. Frielink 2010: 731), it is still 
viewed as essential to criminal justice by Dutch politicians and prosecutors (Brouwer 
2010). The police can also drop cases or even shelve them without investigating, and 
without informing the prosecution service, a matter regulated in detail through binding 
prosecution policy directives. One such concerns criminal discrimination and it removes 
the discretionary power that the principle of expediency confers from both the prosecutor 
and the police. In other words, mandatory prosecution applies to all offences defined as 
discriminatory. The police must officially record all such cases and forward all reports to 
the prosecution service. The prosecutor may not waive prosecution for reasons other than 
insufficient evidence. In cases involving hate crime, or at least the Dutch version of it, the 
prosecutor must demand an enhanced sentence.28  
This prosecution directive has effectively created a new, but vaguely identified 
crime. While discriminatory group defamation and incitement are defined in law, any 
                                                 
27 See: www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/zoeken-in-adviezen/tekst-advies.html?id=11609 
28 Aanwijzing Discriminatie (2007A010), Staatscourant 2007, 233. 
other form of criminal discrimination covers a huge range of potential behaviour. The 
decision whether or not to identify a crime as discriminatory is therefore left to the 
discretion of the police officer handling the case and depends on the circumstances and 
the officer’s own interpretation of what constitutes such an offence. His only guidance is 
the prosecution directive that provides no definition but simply mentions the 
‘discriminatory’ context of a common crime, which may or may not be biased 
motivation, and links it to the grounds for prejudice characteristic of discriminatory group 
defamation. It is therefore the broader context rather than the offender’s motive that 
determines what the EU-Directive calls ‘hate crime’. That is consistent with an important 
Dutch legal principle that only deeds, not thoughts, may be the subject of criminal law. 
From the Dutch point of view it is not only exceedingly difficult to prove biased motive 
(a problem that all countries face), it is also highly undesirable to take it into 
consideration.   
Because of this, and because discriminatory group defamation is defined in detail 
in the Criminal Code, in identifying hate crime police officers usually fall back on its 
most easily recognisable context factor: discriminatory speech. However, uncertainty 
about what the socially acceptable limits of free speech have now become and a 
traditional legal-cultural attitude to policing (and indeed to the criminal law) combine to 
undermine the idea of mandatory prosecution of criminal discrimination. The Dutch 
police regard themselves as much more than mere law enforcers, and their traditional 
powers under the principle of expediency provide a justification for autonomous 
decisions based on what they see as the public interest (and here the idea that 
prosecutions and criminal trials are more likely to exacerbate the social conflict that 
underlies discrimination than provide a solution, plays an important part). They do not, 
therefore, regard mandatory enforcement of the criminal law as the most effective way to 
deal with the social and political causes and effects of prejudice and hate. Research by 
Grijsen (2013) has shown that police officers are more inclined to try to mediate or to 
involve social services than to file a report with the prosecutor in discrimination cases; 
and they are slow to recognise hate crime unless it is accompanied by unequivocal 
discriminatory speech.  
What goes for the police goes equally for the prosecutors who deal with hate 
speech and hate crime. They too struggle with biased motivation and are not always 
willing to prosecute or to demand the penalty enhancement that the directive requires, 
and regard mandatory prosecution of hate speech and hate crime as an inroad into the 
traditional discretionary powers conferred by the principle of expediency, which 
therefore undermines their ability to act in the public good. As part of a study of 
prosecution and sentencing in discrimination cases, Brants et al. conducted interviews 
and focus groups with police officers, prosecutors and judges and encouraged them to 
discuss different scenarios and the merits of mandatory prosecution and enhanced 
sentencing. They found that police officers generally doubted the efficacy of the criminal 
law in discrimination cases and were resentful of being deprived of the opportunity to 
deal with them in what they saw as more effective ways. Prosecutors were divided among 
themselves for the same reasons, with only a minority favouring mandatory prosecution. 
Finally, should criminal discrimination be brought to trial, there is no guarantee that a 
court will convict or hand down an enhanced sentence. Dutch courts enjoy exceedingly 
wide sentencing discretion between the general minimum and specific maximum per 
offence, and have a wide range of alternative penalties. Although the prosecutor demands 
a certain sentence, it is at the court’s discretion whether to follow that demand. The 
judges in this study showed themselves reluctant to convict ordinary people for making 
the same remarks as public opinion leaders have made without being convicted (or even 
remarks less damaging) and refused point blank to countenance the idea of sentence 





So, are there limits to harmonisation and how should we understand them? The two 
examples above concern only one country, but are indicative of more general issues. To 
start with, harmonisation is a problematic concept in so far as it implies that it is a process 
of which the end result is harmony because fundamental differences have been 
eradicated. That overlooks the fact that the laws and procedures of the different EU 
member states differ because they are not functional equivalents – in other words, they 
are not merely different solutions to a common problem. While there may be concepts 
and problems in the abstract that are supranational across the EU – such as fair trial and 
crime – national ideas about what is required to deal with specific issues in different 
countries depend on different definitions and constructions that are determined by 
different socio-political and legal-cultural circumstances and traditions. Countries define 
problems from different perspectives and consider them in different degrees of 
seriousness. Removing the differences in the way that countries express these 
idiosyncrasies in substantive laws and procedures alters surface appearances, but not the 
deep-seated attitudes and perceptions that are embedded in different legal cultures and 
social constructions of crime.  
The Member States do not share a European legal culture or a European social 
construction of crimes – at least, not yet. At the same time, we should not lose sight of 
the dialectical process in which the definition of problems and their legal solutions are 
mutually reinforcing. From that perspective, harmonisation is a top-down mechanism, a 
tool, which has an effect on bottom-up changes in nation states regarding legal culture 
and social constructions of crime. Such changes, however, represent a slow and 
fundamental process that, in the context of the European Union, where the term 
harmonisation refers to no more than ironing out differences in laws and procedures, is 
better referred to as convergence. Legal systems and social constructions of crime may 
gradually come together to such an extent that, over time and at the level of essential 
characteristics, it no longer makes sense to regard them as fundamentally diverse and 
therefore as impediments a common legal order, even though (some of) their rules of 
positive law may differ (Brants and Ringnalda 2011:10). Convergence is not, therefore, 
dependent on harmonisation, but may be encouraged and hastened by it. It is also a less 
normative concept than harmonisation which implies the ‘good’ condition of harmony as 
its inevitable result.    
  Mechanisms of harmonisation - such as the European Court of Human Rights, 
Framework Decisions and Directives and the gradual reform of the infrastructure of 
justice in the European Union – certainly play a role in Europe, but it is important to 
distinguish between criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Convergence is a 
concept typically employed in socio-legal approaches and usually applied to procedural 
issues. Here, issues of convergence are often regarded as problematic, given the 
presumed predominant and particularly visible role of procedure in legal tradition and 
culture (Merryman 1985). The Dutch reaction to Salduz seems a case in point. In contrast 
there is little (political or academic) debate on the convergence of different social 
constructions of crime, perhaps because it is taken as given that, once states have agreed 
to enact more or less identical substantive provisions, the desired change has been 
achieved. It is, however, much more problematic to tackle the socio-political and 
intangible moral differences that affect the social construction of crime and the 
implementation of substantive law than to enact, albeit not unproblematic and gradual, 
changes in procedure.  
One of the reasons is that enforcement mechanisms in the procedural field do 
exist and, however deficient, can combine to produce considerable external pressure. The 
European Commission regards the influence of the European Convention as insufficiently 
robust. States may amend their procedures and/or practices as a result of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ case law, but this is usually piecemeal and ad hoc. Moreover, in 
taking account of differences in legal traditions and systems, the Court leaves room for 
states to interpret what are meant as exceptions as the minimum norm and therefore the 
rule, to which they then create their own exceptions, thereby gradually lowering the 
standard. Prime examples of this are the rules governing the right to directly confront 
witnesses – and Salduz.  
However, an EU-Directive has added value in that it directly forces states into 
compliance. It is applicable before the domestic courts on transposition or to some extent 
under the doctrine of direct effect; it takes precedence, under the principle of primacy of 
EU law, over conflicting domestic provisions and also allows a preliminary ruling by the 
European Court of Justice. In the case of legal assistance, it has forced the Netherlands to 
amend criminal procedure to a far greater extent than the Salduz doctrine did. On the 
other hand, this will also, as the Commission recognises, be exceedingly costly for 
Member States. Whether the tens, in some cases hundreds, of millions that will be needed 
to bring each Member State to compliance with the Directive, will be forthcoming in 
these days of European austerity is a moot question: the protection of procedural rights is 
not the first thing states want to spend money on under any circumstances. These are 
practical considerations that will dilute convergence and slow it down. At the same time, 
issues of principle promote procedural convergence. Even if fair trial is a matter of 
definition, its (moral) desirability is not in question in Europe – to that extent Member 
States do share a European legal culture – and the definition itself is slowly converging. 
On the issue of the presence of lawyers during police questioning, Dutch procedure will 
change in the direction of what the majority of states already allow or will allow in 
future. The process is slow, always a compromise, and as a result, convergence is 
probably, by definition, on the lowest possible standard. But even if some countries have 
to be dragged there kicking and screaming, it is still convergence.  
The factors that promote or limit convergence of substantive criminal law are less 
easily identified. As we have seen, despite the fact that Dutch legislation seems to comply 
with the requirements of the Framework Decision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia, reality is very different. This framework decision was already the result of 
considerable political negotiation and compromise, not least because most Member States 
– but traditionally not the Netherlands – regard penalising forms of speech as highly 
undesirable given the overriding value of the freedom of expression. As a result, the 
Framework Decision identifies action against specific victims rather than undesirable 
speech in itself as the subject of criminalisation on the basis of the perpetrator’s 
underlying motive. This forms a drastic departure from both the social construction of 
hate speech as the public order offence of discriminatory group definition in the 
Netherlands, and Dutch legal doctrine where motive is never a constituent element of a 
crime. At the same time, traditionally determined attitudes to the use of criminal law as a 
means of social control and the corresponding organisation and distribution of powers in 
the Dutch criminal justice system, have meant that the Netherlands, while complying de 
lege with European norms, could effectively refrain de facto from criminalising hate 
crime that does not involve discriminatory group defamation or incitement to hate or 
violence. And even the latter has been eroded in the specific socio-political circumstances 
and upheavals of anti-Islam populism and the related reappraisal of the freedom of 
expression that have undermined the traditional social construction of discrimination as a 
crime. 
There is no reason to suppose that comparable, if different, issues have not arisen 
in other Member States. Convergence in the field of substantive criminal law requires 
compatible moral attitudes that are reflected in criminal policy. I would hazard a guess 
that it lags far behind the process of procedural convergence in Europe, if only because 
the European Court of Human Rights mostly concerns itself with procedural matters.29  
However, unlike procedural issues and legal culture, the social construction of crime and 
substantive criminal law seldom form the subject of comparative research, probably 
because it is so difficult to identify and understand the moral differences and ingrained 
attitudes to criminal law and its enforcement that produce and are produced by different 
social constructions of crime and justice in different societies. Perhaps a greater focus in 
this field would help us better understand the potential scope of and limits to what the 
European Union continues to call harmonisation.     
                                                 
29 There are, of course exceptions, although even the (recent) doctrine of positive obligations is approached 
primarily from a procedural point of view. 
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